In [1] it was proved that 20 of 64 PGV hash functions [2] based on block cipher are collision-resistant and one-way in the black-box model of the underlying block cipher. Here, we generalize the definition of PGV-hash function into a hash family and we will prove that, aside from the previously reported 20 hash functions, we have 22 more collision-resistant and one-way hash families. As all these 42 families are keyed hash family, these are also target-collision-resistant. All these 42 hash families have tight upper and lower bounds on (target) collision-resistant and one-wayness. key words: hash function, block cipher, black-box model, provable security
Introduction
Brief History. Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle [2] considered the 64 basic ways of constructing a (collisionresistant) hash function H : ({0, 1} n ) * → {0, 1} n from a block cipher E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . They regarded 12 of these 64 schemes as secure, though no proofs or formal claims were given. After that Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [1] presented a more proof-centric look at the schemes from PGV, providing both upper and lower bounds for each. They proved that, in the black box model of a block cipher, 12 of 64 compression functions are CRHFs (CollisionResistant Hash Functions) and 20 of 64 extended hash functions are CRHFs.
Motivation for Our Study. Examples of the most commonly used collision-resistant hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1. For such hash functions, one cannot exactly analyze security. However, the security of collision-resistant or one-way PGV hash functions can be analyzed under the assumption that the underlying block cipher is a black box, i.e., random permutation. However, the security of other notions like target collision resistance cannot be analyzed because it needs a family of hash functions instead of a single hash function. Moreover, it seemed that more PGV hash functions will be secure if we change the original definition † † The authors are with Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India.
† † † The authors are with Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea.
a) E-mail: sangjin@korea.ac.kr of the PGV hash function. Thus, we generalize the definition of the PGV hash function to mean a PGV hash family and prove some security notions like target collision resistance, collision resistance and one-way-ness.
General Definition of PGV hash family. Let 0 ≤ l < n and E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a block cipher. If l = 0, let {0, 1} 0 = { }, where is the empty string. Using the block cipher E, we want to construct the compression function family
n . Let h 0 , v ∈ {0, 1} n be fixed values. We define the 64 ways to construct a (block-cipher-based) compression f unction f amily F = { f k } k∈{0,1} l in the following manner: for each k ∈ {0, 1} l ,
where a, b, c ∈ {h, (m||k), h ⊕ (m||k), v}. Note that |h| = n and |m| = n − l. Then we can define the extended hash f amily H = {H k } k∈{0,1} l from the compression function family F = { f k } k∈{0,1} l as follows: for each k ∈ {0, 1} l , H k : ({0, 1} n−l ) * → {0, 1} n is defined by
Note that the key k of the extended hash family is equal to the key of the compression function family.
Note that if l = 0, then
singleton set corresponding to the original definition of PGV [2] . In this case, we denote F as just f without the superscript . We call this f a (block-cipher-based) compression f unction. Similarly, we denote H as H without the superscript . We call this H an extended hash function.
Results. For 0 < l < n, the security of the 64 schemes is summarized in Table 1 , which also serve to define the different extended hash functions H ı and their compression functions f ı . In this paper, we fix E1 = {1, ..., 20}, E2 = {21, 22, 26, 28}, E3= {23, 24, 25, 31, 34, 35}, E4= {27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36}, and E5 = {37, ..., 42}. Here, the numbers correspond to the numbers in the first column of Table 1. E6 is a set of the remaining extended hash families that are not represented in the first column of Table 1 Summary of results of 64 extended hash families. Column 1 shows our number ı for the function family (We write F ı for the compression function family and H ı for its induced extended hash family). Column 2 shows the number from [2] . Column 3 defines f k (h i−1 , m i ) for some k ∈ {0, 1} l . We write x i for (m i ||k) and w i for x i ⊕ h i−1 . Columns 4 and 5 show our (target) collision resistance bounds. Columns 6 and 7 show our inversion resistance bounds. Note that there is a restriction on q for some cases (See Theorem 2).
17
21
the hash family that is used to prove the security. A highlevel summary is given in Tables 2 and 3 . The adversarial model (and the definition of q) will be described below. It should be noted that there exists a trade-off between the size of l and efficiency. If l is large, then we can obtain better security but we lose efficiency. [1] . EHF = extended hash family, (T)CB= (target) collision bound, and IB= inversion bound. Table 3 0 < l < n. This is analyzed in this paper. Abbreviations are the same as those in Table 2 .
Our security model is the one dating to Shannon [6] and used for works like [3] - [5] . The adversary A is given access to oracles E and E −1 where E is a random block cipher E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and E −1 is its inverse. That is, each key a ∈ {0, 1} n names a randomly se-
n , and the adversary is given oracles E and E −1 . The latter, on input (a, y), returns a point x such that E a (x) = y. See [1] for more details and discussions about the black-box model.
In the above PGV hash function families, we do not use any mask keys unlike in [7] , [10] , [12] , and [13] . We prove the target collision resistance of these hash families under the black-box model and it will be more efficient in terms of key size compared with the results in [7] , [10] , [12] , and [13] wherein mask keys are used.
Preliminary
Notation. We use the following standard notations in this paper.
n . The extended hash f amily of compression function family
9. We write x R ← S for the experiment on choosing a random element from the finite set S and calling it x.
Assumption. From now on, we will always assume E :
n is a random block cipher, i.e., for each a ∈ {0, 1}
n , E a (·) is a random permutation. Adversaries are probabilistic algorithms. Thus, every probability in this paper is based on the randomness of the block cipher and random coins. We fix h 0 , v ∈ {0, 1} n .
Collision resistance and Inversion resistance of hash function (l = 0). To quantify the collision resistance of the (block-cipher-based) hash function H, we consider the random block cipher E. An adversary A is given oracles for E(·, ·) and E −1 (·, ·) and wants to find a collision for H,
We also define the difficulty in inverting hash functions. We use the following measure for the difficulty of A in inverting a hash function at a random point.
Definition 1: (Collision resistance and inversion resistance of the compression function
n . Then the advantages of A in finding collisions and inverse elements in f are
Definition 2: (Collision resistance and inversion resistance of the extended hash function 'H') Let H be a block-cipherbased extended hash function, H : ({0, 1} n ) * → {0, 1} n . Then the advantages of A in finding collisions and inverse elements in H are
Collision resistance, Target collision resistance and Inversion resistance of hash function family (0 < l < n).
To quantify the collision resistance and target collision resistance of the (block-cipher-based) hash function family {H k } k∈{0,1} l , we consider the random block cipher E. The adversary A is given oracles for E(·, ·) and E −1 (·, ·). Then, the adversary A E,E −1 for collision resistance plays the following game called Coll.
A E,E
−1 is given the key k which is chosen uniformly at
collision resistance plays the following game called TColl.
1.
A guess commits to M. 2. The key k is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} l .
The
Definition 3: (Collision resistance, target collision resistance, and inversion resistance of the compression function family 'F ') Let F = { f k } k∈{0,1} l be a block-cipher-based compression function family, where
n . Then the advantages of A with respect to (target) collision resistance and inversion resistance are the following real numbers.
Adv
Coll
Definition 4: (Collision resistance, target collision resistance, and inversion resistance of the extended hash family 'H') Let H = {H k } k∈{0,1} l be a block-cipher-based extended hash family, where H k : ({0, 1} n−l ) * → {0, 1} n . Then the advantage of A with respect to (target) collision resistance and inversion resistance are the following real numbers. 
Conventions.
We follow conventions similar to those in [1] . Note that these conventions are important for facilitating discussion and proving the following theorems. In the rest of this paper, we assume the following significant conventions. These assumptions are all without loss of generality in that the adversary A not obeying these conventions can easily be modified to the adversary A having a similar computational complexity that obeys these conventions and has the same advantage as A.
First
, an adversary does not ask any oracle query in which the response is already known; namely, if A asks a query E a (x) and oracle returns y, then A does not ask a subsequent query of E a (x) or E −1 a (y); and if A asks E −1 a (y) and oracle returns x, then A does not ask a subsequent query of E −1 a (y) or E
(Target) Collision Resistance of Extended Hash Family
In this section, we will analyze the security of H ı for each ı ∈ [1, 42] defined in Section 1 in the notion of (target) collision resistance. We consider any adversary A with respect to Coll, i.e., after obtaining random key k, he will try to find a collision pair (
. For that, he will make some E/E −1 queries. The transcript of A is defined by the sequence of query-response quadruples {(s i , x i , y i , σ i )} 1≤i≤q where q is the maximum number of queries made by the adversary, s i , x i , y i ∈ {0, 1} n and σ i = +1 (in case of E-query) or −1 (in case of E −1 -query) and E s i (x i ) = y i . (s i , x i , y i , σ i ) will be called the i th query-response quadruple (or q-r quadruple). In this section, we fix some keys k and v. Note that, if σ i = +1 (or −1) then y (or x respectively) is a random string as we assume that the block cipher E s (·) is a random permutation.
Proposition 1: For fixed x, y ∈ {0, 1}
n and A ⊆ {0,
Proof. Before the i th query, at most (i−1) outputs (or inputs) of a block cipher with same key are known. Thus, output (or input) of the next E will be uniformly distributed to at least 2 n − (i − 1) elements.
Here, we fix any arbitrary hash family H ı for ı ∈ [1, 42] . In this section, V := {0, 1} n is called the vertex set and L := {0, 1} n−l the label set. A triple (h 1 , h 2 , m) ∈ V×V×L (or a pair (h 1 , h 2 ) ∈ V × V) is called the labeled arc (or an arc only). We also say that (h 1 , h 2 , m) is an arc (h 1 , h 2 ) with the label m, or m is a label of the arc (h 1 , h 2 ) and we use the notation h 1 → m h 2 . Now, given a triple τ = (s, x, y), where, s, x, y ∈ V, we define a set of labeled arcs A(τ) by
For example, in the case of
Given a set of labeled arcs A, we define induced arc x 1 , y 1 The next proposition will be used for security analysis. It gives an upper bound of |O i | and indicates the structure of the set of labeled arcs A(τ i ) and A (τ i ).
. → m a h a is a path in A(τ[i]) and H
k ı (m 1 || · · · ||m a ) = h a . Definition 5: When ı ∈ E1, E2 or E4, h in T i is old if deg(h) ≥ 1 in T i or h = h 0 . When ı ∈ E2 or E4, h in T i is old if h = h 0 or there exists an h 1 such that deg(h 1 ) ≥ 1 in T i and h[R] = h 1 [R]. Here, deg(h) = indeg(h)+outdeg(h).
Proposition 2:
If A(τ i ) is not empty then we have the following.
For ı ∈ E1 or E2, A(τ i ) is a singleton and |O
= u}, where h 1 and u are fixed depending only on j and τ i . Thus, the graph of A (τ i ) resembles an outward directed star and Moreover, for each (h 1 , h 2 ) ∈ A (τ i ), there exists a unique m such that h 1 → m h 2 . For the hash families E3, E4 and E5, if
Proof. Bounds for |O i |'s and the last part of the proposition are straightforward from the structure of A (τ i ). We will prove this for one hash function from each class. Other cases will be very similar and one can check analogously. Let
1. In the case of
In the case of H 21 , after defining A(τ) in this section, we have shown that
otherwise it is an empty set.
In the case of H
} if x i = s i , otherwise it is an empty set.
3. In the case of H 27 , f k 27 (h 1 , m) := E w 1 (w 1 ) ⊕ (m||k) where
4. In the case of H 37 , we can similarly prove that A(
it is an empty set.
Definition 6: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ q, we define some events.
1. C i : the adversary gets a collision after i th query. 2. PathColl i : there exist two paths P 1 and P 2 (not necessarily distinct) from h 0 to some h * in T i such that P 1 and P 2 have two different labels. 3. Succ i : there exists an arc (h, h ) ∈ A (τ i ), where both h and h are old vertices in T i−1 .
Proposition 3:
The event PathColl i is equivalent to C i .
Proof. C i ⇔ PathColl i can be proved using the last part of Observation 1.
Proposition 4:
For E1, E2, E3, and E4 hash families, the conditional event (C i | ¬C i−1 ) necessarily implies Succ i . For E5, C i necessarily implies Succ i for some i ≤ i.
Proof. Let P 1 and P 2 be two distinct paths from h 0 to h * in T i with different labels for some h * . As PathColl i−1 is not true, there exists at least one arc in P 1 ∪ P 2 which corresponds to τ i . If Succ i is not true, then one of the vertices of an arc corresponding to τ i should be new in T i−1 which implies that there exist two arcs either (h 1 , h 2 ), (h 2 , h 3 ) or  (h 1 , h 3 ), (h 2 , h 3 ) corresponding to τ i . However, this is not possible by the structure of A (τ i ) (see Proposition 2) in the cases of E1, E2, E3 and E4 hash families. Similarly we can prove it when P 1 = P 2 .
In the case of the E5 hash function for P 1 = P 2 , the proof is similar as (h 1 , h 3 ), (h 2 , h 3 ) case will not arise. Thus, assume that P 1 and P 2 are different and there exist (h 1 , h 3 ) and (h 2 , h 3 ) corresponding to τ i in the path
is true, then we have two paths P 1 and P 2 in T i−1 from h 0 to h a = h 1 and h b = h 2 , respectively. Let
for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ i, then at least one new vertex from P 1 ∪ P 2 is added to O j for each j whenever it is added. As there are new a + b vertices for T 0 in P 1 ∪ P 2 and at most one arc can be added to A j (τ i ) every time (because of the structure of A j (τ i )) we have to add exactly one new vertex in each i , because
. Thus, we will add two new vertices in P 1 ∪ P 2 to a set of old vertices when we add h 1 or h 2 first time and hence contradiction. Proof. Let A be an adversary attacking H ı . Assume that A asks its oracles at mostueries. Assume that the random key k is given. Let (s i , x i , y i , σ i ) be the i th q-r quadruple. Consider H k 1 in the case of the E1 hash family. For the other hash families in E1, the proof is analogous to the proof of H k 1 . 1. Case 1:
(by Propositions 1 and 2). 2. Case 2: 1 and 2) .
in the case of the E2 hash family. For the other hash families in E2, the proof is analogous to the proof of 21.
1. Case 1: 1 and 2 ). 2. Case 2:
in the case of the E3 hash family. For the other hash families in E3, the proof is analogous to the proof of 21. For E4/E5 hash functions, the proof is analogous to the proof of 23.
If
. Therefore, by Propositions 1 and 2, Pr[
Thus, we have the following theorem using Observation 2. Note that we can first prove 1 and 3 of the following theorem with the restriction q ≤ 2 n−1 . However, in this case the upper bound is vacuous when q > 2 n−1 . Thus, we do not need to restrict q ≤ 2 n−1 in cases 1 and 3.
By the following theorem, the upper bound of advantage for the E1 hash family can also be obtained from that of the corresponding hash function presented in [1] .
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary with respect to Coll for the hash family H ı . We can easily construct the adversary B with respect to Coll for H ı . Choose k at random from {0, study other security notions such as the target collision resistance. In fact, all these 42 hash families become targetcollision-resistant. As AES is treated as a good candidate for a block cipher, we can implement these hash families using AES. From our results, only the attack for these hash families should explore some internal weakness of AES. That is, these hash families can be practically constructed using AES until we obtain some weakness of AES. The proof techniques used here are natural and direct for security notions. Thus, one can also study these proof techniques to obtain good ideas about using the black-box model. 
